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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the effects of R&D spillover on European equities. Contrary to previous studies 
in the US, I find little evidence that companies’ R&D increases predict abnormal stock returns for 
their peers. Moreover, it appears that firms operating in high R&D growth industries who have little 
R&D growth of their own experience weaker returns compared with the rest of the sample. This result 
suggests that any value investors place on R&D spillover pales in comparison to the implicit loss of 
competitive advantage.  
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1. Introduction 
Research and development (R&D) is particularly difficult for investors to value for a couple of 
reasons. First, R&D - projects are much riskier than other forms of investment. Second, unlike capital 
expenditures, the most if not all R&D is expensed; it does not show up on any balance sheets. Third, 
unlike other investments, firms which conduct R&D are often not able to exclude others from 
obtaining its benefits. The expenses of R&D are glaringly tangible while its value is as difficult to 
grasp as any. 
The consensus is that despite its accounting treatment, R&D should be taken into account as a vital 
part of companies’ assets. However, a large body of research has found that the market is slow to 
react to R&D information, or persistently misvalues it (Hall, 1993; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; Cohen, 
Diether & Malloy 2013; Eberhart, Maxwell & Siddique, 2004).  
Equally as uncertain and debatable as is R&D itself is the way its benefits and externalities spread 
within companies, industries and economies. In economics it is a stylized fact that technological 
innovation is ultimately the source of prolonged growth. Companies innovate in search of profits and 
as a result they drive their respective industries forward. The difference between private and social 
rates of return is categorized as innovation spillover, and though it is difficult to measure, its size has 
been estimated to be double that of the private return (Mansfield et al. 1977). However, the exact 
effect that companies’ innovation has on their peer companies’ performance is still up for debate.  
In their study of firms listed in the US, Jiang, Qian & Yao (2016) find that following a sudden 
industry R&D increase driven by a small group of innovative firms, their peer companies experience 
delayed abnormal stock returns. Jiang et al. attribute this to a combination of industry spillover and 
investor inattention; ideas and technology spread between firms, and new products and services create 
demand and expand the market. This positive effect is taken into account in stock prices, albeit at a 
delayed rate, which allows for an investment strategy where portfolio firms are selected based on their 
peers’ R&D increases. 
In this thesis, I examine in the spirit of Jiang et al. (2016) whether this effect applies for European 
equities. In other words, do the innovations of firms, for which R&D spending acts as a proxy, predict 
delayed abnormal returns for their industry peers. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper 
to study the effect in this fashion in Europe. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1. The effect of R&D in predicting future returns 
Companies invest in research and development (R&D) in order to improve and develop new products, 
services and processes. However not every penny reaps rewards; especially in the pharmaceuticals 
industry, almost 80% of research projects end up chasing loose threads and don’t lead to monetary 
benefits (DiMasi et al. 2003). Many academics have studied the determinants of effective R&D 
investment. For example, Tsai et al (2005) find a u – shaped relationship between company size and 
R&D productivity, while Graves & Langowitz (1993) find a diminishing rate of return for increase in 
R&D, as measured by the number of patents.  
The effects of R&D on share value are dependent on not only the quality of patents produced, but also 
on the current level of technological prowess within the industry. Hall, B. H., Jaffe, A., & Trajtenberg 
(2005) find an increase of 3% market value per each patent citation, and Chan et al. (1990) find that 
R&D investments are likely to be more beneficial to high-tech firms’ stock value than to low-tech 
firms. 
Valuation of R&D is based on the end results: new products, processes and patents. However, it can 
be argued that the sheer level of R&D gives vital information about a firm’s future prospects. 
Company management typically increases R&D only when they see it as a worthwhile investment. 
This means that companies’ sudden R&D increases implicitly reveal a lot about their growth 
prospects and ability to innovate. Following this theory, R&D increase announcements should be met 
with increased stock returns. Eberhart et al. (2005) document abnormal operating performance and 
stock returns following sudden R&D increases, while Duqi, Mirti and Torluccio (2011) find similar 
effects with European listed companies. Most recently, Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) argue that 
firms prior R&D track records predict their future performance but that this is systematically 
undervalued by the market. Other studies have drawn similar conclusions (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; 
Toivanen 2002). Most of the abnormal returns can largely be attributed to the high level of risk 
associated with R&D-intensive firms (Chan et al. 2001; Ho, Xu, Yap 2004). In his study of US firms 
during the 1980’s, Hall (1993) estimates the discount rates for R&D investments to be as high as 81%. 
Prior research has showed fundamental differences in R&D valuation between the United Kingdom 
and continental European countries. Bond, Harhoff & Van Reenen (2003) find that German firms 
invest significantly more in R&D than UK firms, which is attributed to a higher required rate of return 
of R&D investment in the UK. Hall et al. (2006) also find significant disparities between the Anglo-
Saxon and continental European countries. They find evidence that in the UK, R&D is valued as 
much as three times as high as in Germany and France. They attribute this to differences in public 
incentives, the role which public research institutions have on innovation, and in particular, 
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shareholder rights. In countries such as France and Italy which have relatively worse protection for 
shareholders, large owners can appropriate minority shareholders’ profits with information 
asymmetries of R&D investments, as theorized by Aboody & Lev (2000). Therefore these agency 
problems counter some of the value-positive effect of R&D. 
When comparing R&D valuation in the United States and Europe, it is important to keep in mind the 
differences between accounting standards. In contrast to the US GAAP standards, IFRS/IAS permits 
R&D capitalization if multiple criteria regarding the probability of monetary benefits are met. 
According to the IAS: “Development costs are capitalised only after technical and commercial 
feasibility of the asset for sale or use have been established”. This means that the nature of the studied 
variable deviates between US companies and their European counterparts: the latter will be slightly 
smaller and include a higher proportion of basic research. However, assuming capitalization rates stay 
relatively stable across time and industry, adding a coefficient (in this case one minus the 
capitalization ratio) does not alter variable increase rates. I therefore consider IFRS – based R&D 
costs a reliable proxy for industry innovation. 
2.2. Industry spillover and other R&D externalities 
Spillover refers to the spread of ideas and technologies between companies. Excluding patent-
protected innovations (which aren’t safe bets either, as per Mansfield (1981)), companies cannot fully 
keep the benefits of their R&D efforts exclusively to themselves, and most of the time they don’t even 
bother to (Milliou, 2009). For example, Griliches (1979) argues that companies’ output is heavily 
dependent on their peers’ prior research efforts. Numerous studies have documented a similar positive 
effect of company R&D on the industry peers, be it cost reduction (Bernstein & Nadiri, 1989) or 
productivity (Raut, 1995; Scherer, 1982).  
Therefore, investors can interpret that R&D increases the pool of knowledge within an industry. Thus 
the industry and the companies it consists of become more appealing, which increases share prices for 
not only for those who invest in R&D but also for those who don’t. However, the exact positive 
effects of R&D spillover are often difficult to quantify. For example, Geroski (1991) estimates that 
innovations’ long-run effects on productivity growth are often tenfold that of the short-term effects, 
but it might take 10-15 years for them to realize.  
This leads us to the second short-term investor interpretation, which is a negative one. The primary 
incentive which drives company R&D is to escape competition. If a company’s research efforts make 
its peers’ products obsolete, and it achieves in holding exclusive rights to its inventions, then it is 
understandable that as a result peers underperform.  In this view, the market sees peer companies as 
falling behind competition as the leader firms progress. As some (Jaffe, 1996; De Bondt, 1997) have 
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documented, companies’ innovations often increase their profits at the expense of the industry as a 
whole.  
Which effect ultimately dominates is difficult to say. In their study of 17 OECD countries between 
years 1973 – 2000, Bitzer & Geishecker (2006) found that competition-related negative effects 
outweighed the positive spillover effect in an international setting. Kafouros & Buckley (2008) argue 
that the net effect of industry R&D on their peer companies’ performance depends on their ability to 
benefit from external innovations. Such ability increases with the technological advancement and 
decreases with firm size.  
2.3. Research question and hypotheses 
Innovation is vital for company performance, but there are conflicting views on how R&D affects 
peer companies. In this paper I study European industries with high aggregate R&D expense growth 
in order to gain a better understanding about the following issues. What prospects does the market see 
for those investing in R&D and for those following the pack? Is industry spillover reflected in share 
prices? Are the net effects of rival companies’ research efforts likely to be beneficial or detrimental to 
company value? Is the market efficient in reacting to information revealed by R&D input? In addition 
to these issues, I study the stock returns of industry R&D leaders in order to find out whether the 
market misvalues endogenous R&D, as documented by previous studies. 
My first hypothesis is as follows: Companies’ R&D – expenses act as proxies for innovation, and 
sudden R&D increases imply brighter prospects for their respective companies (Eberhart et al. 2004). 
Since companies cannot withhold all their information exclusively to themselves, their research 
efforts benefit their peer companies also, either in the form of increased productivity or by expanding 
the market. The stock market doesn’t immediately react to this information, which means that peer 
company stocks outperform others the year following their identification. 
H1a: Companies’ sudden R&D increases predict abnormal stock returns for their peers. 
The competing hypothesis is that those companies which do not invest in R&D fall behind their 
competition. The positive spillover effect of R&D is outweighed by the loss of market share and 
technological advancement. This hypothesis predicts that following industry R&D increase events, 
those companies trailing their peers in R&D spending underperform. 
H1b: Companies’ sudden R&D increases predict negative abnormal returns for their peers. 
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3. Data and methods 
3.1. Sample and selection criteria 
All company data is gathered from Datastream. European risk factors are gathered from Kenneth 
French’s website. UK risk factors are gathered from University of Exeter’s Xfi Centre for Finance and 
Investment. The sample period is 1992 – 2014. I begin the filtering process by including all publicly 
listed companies, current and previous (excluding dual listings), which Thompson Reuters classifies 
under “Europe”. I then group these companies into industries based on the TRBC industry group 
classifications. Following Fama and French (1993), I exclude all companies under economic sectors 
“55 Financials” and “59 Utilities”, as they either operate in substantially regulated industries or 
otherwise fundamentally differ from the rest of the sample. This filtering results in 127,811 firm-year 
observations. I then exclude all firm-year observations which do not report their R&D expenses 
during observation year t or year t–1. This leaves me with a total of 15,986 firm-year observations. 
The process of identifying industry R&D leaders and peers goes as follows. In each year I define 
R&D growth industries as those having aggregate R&D expense growth of over 20% over the 
previous year. I then divide these R&D industry firms into two categories, “leaders” and “peers”. 
Leaders are defined as companies which have R&D/assets and R&D/revenue ratios of over 2% and 
have R&D growth rates ranking in the top 10% within an industry year1. All firms which do not meet 
these criteria are defined as peers. Firm-year observations outside of R&D growth industries are 
defined as non-event firms.  
Following Jiang et al. (2016) in studying the effect of R&D spillover, I control for firms’ R&D 
growth, R&D expenses relative to assets (RDA) and market value of equity (RDE), the natural 
logarithm of company market cap (SIZE), book-to-market ratios (BM) as well as the average 11-
month return from June of year t-1 to May year t (RET). 
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of these variables for leaders, peers and non-event 
firms. I winsorize all values at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The significance of differences between 
firm type characteristics are based on t-tests. The most glaring difference between sample groups is 
the R&D growth rate: leader firms have an average R&D increase of 150%, while peers and non-
event firms have much smaller growth rates by comparison. Leader firms are smaller, more highly 
valued, and have higher average monthly returns during the year before their identification than non-
event firms. Peer firms’ characteristics fall between the two but bear more resemblance towards the 
non-event firms. In total, the sample consists of 15,986 firm-year observations, of which 377 are 
 
1 If the sample of firms is less than 50, top 5 firms are selected as leaders instead, assuming they meet both RDA 
and RDS criteria and have growth rates of over 20%. Especially in the beginning of the sample period this is the 
case as few firms report their R&D expenses. This increases the ratio of leaders to peers in the sample. 
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leaders and 2258 are peers. Combined, leaders and peers make up for roughly 16% of the total 
sample. 
Table 1. Characteristics of European leaders, peers and non-event firms during years 1992-2014. 
This table reports the characteristics of R&D Growth is the increase in R&D expenditures in year t relative to 
year t-1. RDA and RDE represent R&D expenditures relative to total assets and market capitalization, 
respectively. Ln(size) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization (millions). BM refers to the book to 
market ratio. RET is the average monthly return from June year t-1 to May t. All values are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. The difference between means is based on a Welsch's t-test, and t-values are 
reported in parantheses. 
 
Tables 6, 7 and figure 1 present distributions of the whole sample by country, industry and year. 
R&D-intensive industries, such as biotechnology & medical research, software & IT services, and 
pharmaceuticals dominate the year-industry list. Over half of all firm-year observations are from 
companies listed in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Switzerland. Most of the firm-year 
observations take place between years 2005 – 2014. 
3.2. Methodology 
Similar to Jiang et al. (2016), I follow two approaches in estimating the effect industry spillover has 
on stock returns. In the portfolio approach, I construct peer and leader portfolios and compute alphas 
based on the Fama-Franch-Carhart four factor model. In the regression approach, I run panel 
regressions to estimate the coefficients of the leader and peer dummy variables on annual stock 
returns when controlling for various firm characteristics.  
3.2.1. Portfolio approach 
I begin by constructing equal-weighted and value-weighted peer and leader portfolios based on their 
firm-year identification status in year t. The holding period is one year, beginning on the 1st of June 
year t and ending on the 1st of June year t +1. Equal weighted monthly returns are computed as the 
monthly average of all portfolio companies. In the value-weighted portfolio, companies’ monthly 
returns are weighted based on their market cap relative to the total industry value. I then regress the 
returns using the model below:  
R𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   
(1) Leader (2) Peer (3) Nonevent (1-3) (2-3) (1-2)
N 377 2258 13,351         
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
R&D Growth 1.5097  3.68     0.2005  0.47     0.1469       0.72     1.36 (7.2) 0.05 (4.56) 1.31 (6.91)
RDA 0.1355  0.23     0.0821  0.14     0.0545       0.09     0.08 (6.76) 0.03 (8.89) 0.05 (4.33)
RDE 0.0995  0.12     0.0797  0.11     0.0549       0.09     0.04 (6.98) 0.02 (9.83) 0.02 (2.92)
SIZE 5.5697  2.37     5.7104  2.36     6.0858       2.44     -0.52 (-4.17) -0.38 (-6.96) -0.14 (-1.07)
BM 0.5150  0.48     0.6050  0.50     0.6596       0.60     -0.14 (-5.75) -0.05 (-4.67) -0.09 (-3.36)
RET 0.0207  0.05     0.0173  0.04     0.0116       0.04     0.01 (3.4) 0.01 (5.89) 0 (1.22)
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The dependent variable R is the portfolio monthly return from June 1st year t to June 1st year t+1 
minus the risk-free rate. MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD refer to the monthly market, size, value and 
momentum factors for European equities. Factor values are gathered from Kenneth French’s website 
(French 2019).  
3.2.2. Regression approach 
In the regression approach, I conduct an annual fixed effects panel regression. In this model, I include 
all firm-year observations. The model is as follows: 
R𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎 + 𝛽𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑅𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝐵𝑀𝐵𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑛𝐵𝑀𝐷𝑡
𝑛𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   
The dependent variable R is the annual return, beginning on the 1st of year t and ending on the 1st of 
year t+1. The main explanatory variables are leader and peer dummies, denoted as D, which equal 1 if 
the firm-year observation fits the characteristic and zero otherwise. In addition, I control for the 
following factors: 
Firms’ own R&D growth: Previous studies have attributed R&D growth to abnormal returns 
(Eberhart, Maxwell & Siddique, 2004; Diether &Malloy, 2013). To separate this effect from 
industry spillover, I control for firms’ endogenous R&D growth between t and t-1 (RDG), as 
well as R&D relative to market value at the beginning of the holding period (RDE). 
Size and value: Following Horowitz, Loughran & Savin (2000), I control for firm size and 
value using the following variables: Log market capitalization in millions (SIZE), and book to 
market ratio (BM). I include a negative B/M dummy (nBM) to avoid outliers hampering my 
results. 
Industry and price momentum: Industry momentum has been found to explain future stock 
returns (Moskowitz & Grinblatt, 1999). I control for this using the variable IND, which is 
computed as the previous 11 month value weighted return of a stock’s respective industry. In 
addition, I control for stock’s own price momentum (RET), which is measured as the 11-
month average return from June year t-1 to May year t. 
Time fixed effects (TFE): to address the differences in market return and other yearly 
phenomena common across all stocks, I control for time fixed effects in the regression. 
Contrary to Jiang et al. (2016), who run cross-sectional regressions and then estimate coefficients as 
the time series averages, I perform a time-fixed effects panel regression across all firm-year 
observations. The reason for this is that there are too few observations for making proper annual 
estimates.  
10 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Portfolio approach 
The results are reported in table 3. I find that that the equal-weighted leader portfolio displays a 
monthly alpha of 1.2%. This is consistent with previous studies which show that firms with high R&D 
growth levels experience abnormal returns (Eberhart, Maxwell &Siddique, 2004; Jiang et al. 2016). 
However, once the leader stocks are weighted based on their value, this coefficient loses statistical 
significance at the 10% level. This indicates that the leader group’s abnormal returns are mostly 
explained by a loading in small and value stocks. As previous studies (Plyakha, Uppal, Vilkov, 2012; 
Malladi &Fabozzi, 2017) have shown, equal weighted portfolios’ increased returns are explained by 
higher exposure to market, size and value factors, as well as the monthly rebalancing required to 
maintain equal weights.  
Similar to Jiang et al (2016), I find that peer firms also experience abnormal returns, albeit to a lesser 
degree than leader firms with a monthly alpha of 0.88%. This alpha remains statistically significant 
even when applied to the value-weighted portfolio, which generates a monthly alpha of 0.68%. The 
equal-weighted peer portfolio has a market Beta of 1.19, while showing a slight negative loading in 
the HML and UMD factors. The value-weighted peer portfolio shows a surprisingly low 
responsiveness to the market factor and a statistically significant positive UMD coefficient. 
However, one must consider the shortcomings of this method. Aside from the market return, other 
factors do little to explain the returns in each portfolio. I hypothesize that this may be due to two 
reasons. First, the heterogeneity of the European market reduces the robustness of aggregate level 
factors in explaining returns. Second, the number of companies per portfolio varies, and is at times 
less than 10. Therefore at least a part of the observed abnormal returns may be explained by a heavy 
loading of idiosyncratic risk. 
4.1. Regression approach 
The results are reported in table 2. I find the leader dummy to be statistically insignificant. However, 
the peer dummy has a statistically significant negative coefficient of -3.13%. This indicates that 
following an R&D increase event, industry peer firms experience abnormal negative returns which are 
not explained by different firm characteristics or industry momentum. The R&D growth – control 
variable is not statistically significant, which suggests that any value investors place on R&D is 
already reflected in the prices at the beginning of the holding period.  
Most of the other control variables are statistically significant. In particular, the industry momentum 
factor (IND) has a significant positive coefficient (1.82). The sample surprisingly shows a positive 
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coefficient to size, as evidenced by the SIZE and RDE – factors, which is inconsistent with the 
findings of Fama & French (1992) and numerous other studies.  
My two study methods, the portfolio- and the regression approach, yield opposite results. However, 
this is not infeasible. As explained above, the observed alphas of the portfolio approach may be due to 
the model’s inability to explain returns. It would not be prudent to mark all unexplained returns to the 
benefit of spillover. In contrast, the regression approach explicitly assigns a coefficient, negative or 
positive, to those firms with the peer characteristic. On the other hand, the regression approach may 
be biased also. Due to data availability, the majority of the observations take place in 2005 – 2014, 
arguably the dimmest decade the European financial markets have seen. Even when controlling for 
time fixed effects, the global financial crisis of ’08 and the Euro crisis of ’11 surely bring uncertainty 
to my results.  
Table 2. Time fixed effects panel regression results 
This table reports the results of the regression which examines the stock returns of industry leaders, peers and 
non-event firms during years 1992-2014 in Europe. All variables are expressed as decimal figures. The 
dependent variable is the 12-month stock return, starting from the 1st of June year t and ending on the 1st of 
June year t+1. Leader and Peer are dummy variables for R&D leaders and peers. RDG is the increase in R&D 
expenditures between years t and t - 1. RDE represents R&D expenditures relative to market capitalization. 
SIZE is the log market capitalization (millions) in year t. BM is the book to market ratio in year t. nBM dummy is 
a dummy variable which is one when the B/M ratio is negative, and zero otherwise. RET is the 11-month 
average return from June year t-1 to May t. IND is the average monthly return from June year t - 1 to May year 
t. The sample period is 1992 - 2015. '.' , '*', '**', and '***' indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% 
and 0.1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Leader 0.0238 0.0312 0.76 0.4451
Peer -0.0313 0.0160 -1.95 0.0515 .
RDG 0.0001 0.0002 0.49 0.6235
RDE -0.1919 0.0402 -4.77 0.0000 ***
SIZE 0.0071 0.0020 3.52 0.0004 ***
BM 0.0154 0.0029 5.28 0.0000 ***
nBM -0.0977 0.0326 -2.99 0.0028 **
RET -0.0182 0.1080 -0.17 0.8663
IND 1.8177 0.3531 5.15 0.0000 ***
Multiple R^2 0.0089
12 
 
Table 3. Alphas of the value- and equal-weighted portfolios of R&D leaders and peers listed in Europe. 
This table The sample period is 1992 - 2014.  The dependent variable is the monthly return minus the risk-free 
rate. The estimate is done based on the Carhart (1997)four factor model. RMRF refers to the market return 
minus the risk-free rate. SMB, HML and UMD are the size, value, and momentum factors. ".",*, **, and *** 
indicate statistical signifigance at the 10%, 5%,1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
Equal-weighted portfolio
Leader
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.0121 0.0059 2.04 0.042341 *
RMRF 1.3524 0.1186 11.41 < 2e-16 ***
SMB 0.4403 0.2367 1.86 0.064222 .
HML -0.8926 0.2274 -3.93 0.000116 ***
UMD 0.0810 0.1376 0.59 0.556627
Residual Standard Error 0.0844
Degrees of Freedom 223
Multiple R^2 0.3984
Adjusted R^2 0.3876
Peer
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.0088 0.0029 3.02 2.82E-03 **
RMRF 1.1880 0.0579 20.53 < 2e-16 ***
SMB 0.5250 0.1155 4.543 9.07E-06 ***
HML -0.6388 0.1110 -5.756 2.84E-08 ***
UMD -0.1901 0.0672 -2.83 0.00507 **
Residual Standard Error 0.0412
Degrees of Freedom 223
Multiple R^2 0.7026
Adjusted R^2 0.6972
Value-weighted portfolio
Leader
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.0095 0.0062 1.529 0.1278
RMRF -0.3363 0.2484 -1.354 0.1771
SMB -0.6109 0.2386 -2.56 0.0111 *
HML -0.1015 0.1444 -0.703 0.4827
UMD 1.0571 0.1244 8.498 2.76E-15 ***
Residual Standard Error 0.08852
Degrees of Freedom 223
Multiple R^2 0.2925
Adjusted R^2 0.2799
Peer
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.0068 0.0032 2.111 0.0358 *
RMRF -0.2169 0.1276 -1.7 0.0905 .
SMB -0.4097 0.1225 -3.343 0.001 ***
HML -0.0678 0.0742 -0.914 0.3617
UMD 1.0451 0.0639 16.358 0 ***
Residual Standard Error 0.0455
Degrees of Freedom 223
Multiple R^2 0.5916
Adjusted R^2 0.5843
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5. Robustness checks  
I explore both approaches in further detail here. In the first test, I limit my sample to observations 
since 2005. In the second, I winsorize return values in the 1st and 99th percentiles rule out the 
possibility that outliers are driving my results. 
5.1. Limiting the sample to observations post 2005 
 
In contrast to the United States, R&D reporting has not been mandatory in Europe until fairly 
recently. In 2002, the European Union agreed that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
would apply to the companies listed in the EU starting from the 1st of January 20052. Prior to this, 
most companies do not disclose their R&D. This creates a couple of problems. First, the small number 
of firms makes the estimation of aggregate industry R&D growth rates less accurate. Second, the 
criteria for R&D disclosure and capitalization may differ between legislations. Third, the sample of 
firms which voluntarily report their R&D may be biased towards R&D-intensive industries.   
In this robustness test, I use a sample period of 2006 - 2014. This increases the share of firm-year 
observations with R&D information during years t and t-1, and makes firms’ R&D expenses more 
comparable. I begin with the regression approach. The results are reported under table 4. The peer 
dummy remains robust with a statistically significant negative peer dummy of 3.81%. The sample 
once again shows a positive coefficient to size, and a significant positive coefficient to industry 
momentum. For the portfolio approach, I find that both the equal and value weighted leader and peer 
dummies lose statistical significance. This indicates that my initial results are driven by some of the 
issues discussed in section 4.1. The number of month-return observations decrease from 224 to 84. 
The results are reported in table 8 (Appendix).  
5.2. Winsorizing return values 
In finance, some papers’ results have retrospectively been found to have being driven by outlier 
values (Guthrie et al, 2012; Adams et al, 2018). My panel regression might be influenced by outliers, 
such as stock splits, reverse splits, or plain data errors. In order to rule out the possibility that these 
factors are driving my results, I winsorize all return values in the 1st and 99th percentiles. This means 
replacing the most extreme return observations at the top and bottom with 1st and 99th percentile 
values. The results of the winsorized regression approach are reported under table 5. It can be seen 
that using this censored dataset, the negative peer dummy remains statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
2 https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/european-
union/#commitment 
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Table 4: Post-IFRS panel regression results 
This table reports the results of the panel regression with fixed time effects which examines the stock returns 
of leaders, peers and non-event firms listed in Europe during years 2006-2014. All variables are expressed as 
decimal figures. The dependent variable is the 12 month stock return, starting from the 1st of June year t and 
ending on the 1st of June year t+1. Leader and Peer are dummy variables for R&D leaders and peers. RDG is 
the increase in R&D expenditures between years t and t - 1. RDE represents R&D expenditures relative to 
market capitalization. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization (millions) in year t. BM is the book 
to market ratio in year t. nBM dummy is a dummy variable which is one when the B/M ratio is negative, and 
zero otherwise. RET is the average monthly return from June year t-1 to May t. IND is the average monthly 
return from June year t - 1 to May year t. The sample period is 1992 - 2015. '.' , '*', '**', and '***' indicate 
statistical signifigance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Leader 0.01602 0.03918 0.41 0.6827
Peer -0.03810 0.01980 -1.92 0.0543 .
RDG 0.00019 0.00020 0.96 0.3358
RDE -0.18769 0.04594 -4.09 0.0000 ***
SIZE 0.00947 0.00246 3.84 0.0001 ***
BM 0.00961 0.00289 3.32 0.0009 ***
nBM -0.05462 0.03808 -1.43 0.1515
RET -0.06593 0.13950 -0.47 0.6365
IND 2.28270 0.51580 4.43 0.0000 ***
Multiple R^2
0.0098
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Table 5. Winsorized panel regression results 
This table reports the results of the panel regression with fixed time effects which examines the stock returns 
of leaders, peers and non-event firms in Europe during years 1992-2014. Return values are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are expressed as decimal figures. The dependent variable is the 12 month 
stock return, starting from the 1st of June year t and ending on the 1st of June year t+1. Leader and Peer are 
dummy variables for R&D leaders and peers. RDG is the increase in R&D expenditures between years t and t - 
1. RDE represents R&D expenditures relative to market capitalization. SIZE is the log market capitalization 
(millions) in year t. BM is the book to market ratio in year t. nBM dummy is a dummy variable which is one 
when the B/M ratio is negative, and zero otherwise. RET is the average monthly return from June year t-1 to 
May t. IND is the average monthly return from June year t - 1 to May year t. The sample period is 1992 - 2015. 
'.' , '*', '**', and '***' indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Leader 0.0299 0.0253 1.18 0.2374
Peer -0.0288 0.0130 -2.20 0.0275 *
RDG 0.0001 0.0001 0.65 0.5166
RDE -0.1843 0.0327 -5.64 0.0000 ***
SIZE 0.0110 0.0016 6.69 0.0000 ***
BM 0.0115 0.0024 4.86 0.0000 ***
nBM -0.1031 0.0265 -3.89 0.0001 ***
RET 0.0090 0.0878 0.10 0.9182
IND 1.5911 0.2870 5.54 0.0000 ***
Multiple R^2 0.0142
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6. Conclusions 
In this thesis I have studied the effects of industry spillover in stock valuation in Europe. I have 
examined the stock returns of firms which operate in R&D growth industries while having relatively 
little R&D growth of their own (“peers”), as well as those with high R&D growth (“leaders”). I have 
used two approaches in estimating the spillover effect: first by constructing portfolios of both kinds of 
firms, and then by performing a time fixed effects panel regression across all observations. The 
sample consists of European listed companies which report their R&D during the sample period of 
1992 – 2014, which encompasses 15,986 firm-year observations.  
My results turn out mixed. Equal- and value-weighted portfolios consisting of industry peers 
experience positive abnormal returns the year following their identification when controlling for well 
documented risk factors of market exposure, size, value and momentum. However, this effect loses 
statistical significance when restricting the sample to the period when R&D reporting became 
mandatory in the EU (2006-2014). Meanwhile the panel regression shows that peer companies display 
significantly weaker returns compared to non-event firms. The negative coefficient remains robust 
when studying a more comparable subsample (2006- 2014), and when ruling out the influence of 
outliers (winsorizing return values).  
Based on my results, I reject my hypothesis 1a which states that companies’ R&D increases predict 
abnormal positive returns for their peers. On the other hand, I fail to reject my hypothesis 1b. 
According to this hypothesis, companies’ R&D increases predict abnormally low stock returns for 
their peers. There appears to be a persistent negative coefficient that comes with being a part of the 
“peer” – company type. 
My results suggest that the net effects of companies’ innovation on peers’ stock performance is 
negative. Following bursts of industry R&D driven by a small number of innovative firms, investors 
appear to develop a worse outlook for those with only modest R&D growth. For those following the 
pack in innovation, R&D spillover may very well lift share prices, but this effect is thwarted by the 
loss of technological prowess and competitive advantage. This result differs from the findings of Jiang 
et al. (2016) in the US. As prior literature points out, this disparity between Europe and the US may 
be explained by legislation, accounting standards, and shareholder rights. 
However, the results of this study are somewhat limited by the lack of data: even to this day many 
European companies do not disclose their R&D. One must be wary when making conclusions based 
on just a portion of all companies. In addition, as shown by Kafouros & Buckley, 2008, context is 
everything when evaluating R&D. It would be interesting to study these effects on a more specific 
subsample, for example within an industry or a country. 
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8. Appendix 
Table 6 
This table presents alphas on the value- and equal-weighted portfolios of R&D leaders and peers listed in 
Europe. The sample period is 2006 - 2014.  The dependent variable is the monthly return minus the risk-free 
rate. The estimate is done based on the Carhart-four factor model. RMRF refers to the maket return minus the 
risk-free rate. SMB, HML and UMD are the size, value, and momentum factors. ".",*, **, and *** indicate 
statistical signifigance at the 10%, 5%,1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
Equal-weighted portfolio
Leader
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.013720007 0.011009368 1.246212122 0.216369404
RMRF 0.952615119 0.229938722 4.142908635 8.53768E-05 ***
SMB -0.146857095 0.302005794 -0.486272441 0.628120238
HML 0.361658986 0.551618303 0.655632679 0.513965346
UMD 0.363892281 0.630169646 0.5774513 0.565276775
Residual Standard Error 0.098893568
Degrees of Freedom 83
Multiple R^2 0.566434677
Adjusted R^2 0.286460813
Peer
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.001749549 0.002628881 0.665510965 0.507662196
RMRF 1.027825216 0.054906103 18.71968963 8.9505E-31 ***
SMB -0.199640792 0.072114697 -2.768378688 0.00701625 **
HML 0.521387024 0.131718622 3.958339494 0.000163944 ***
UMD -0.024641057 0.150475568 -0.163754538 0.870342602
Residual Standard Error 0.02361438
Degrees of Freedom 83
Multiple R^2 0.946746636
Adjusted R^2 0.891080038
Value-weighted portfolio
Leader
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.009598277 0.011284561 0.850567187 0.397580477
RMRF 0.944661608 0.235686339 4.008130517 0.000137712 ***
SMB 0.01257229 0.309554821 0.0406141 0.967706012
HML -0.221732776 0.565406719 -0.392165089 0.69599224
UMD -0.182024605 0.645921554 -0.281806055 0.778829124
Residual Standard Error 0.101365541
Degrees of Freedom 83
Multiple R^2 0.481142434
Adjusted R^2 0.19258655
Peer
Coefficient Standard Deviation T-value Pr (>|t| )   
Alpha 0.003837514 0.00353124 1.086732549 0.280459744
RMRF 1.03785876 0.073752545 14.07217548 3.15674E-23 ***
SMB -0.195671955 0.096867965 -2.019986229 0.046774856 *
HML -0.245614858 0.176930851 -1.388196892 0.168979456
UMD -0.458811527 0.202126092 -2.269927265 0.025937508 *
Residual Standard Error 0.031719983
Degrees of Freedom 83
Multiple R^2 0.894868048
Adjusted R^2 0.790702182
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Table 7: List of R&D growth industries by year 
 
 
 
Year Industry Year Industry
1992 Pharmaceuticals 2004 Household Goods; Professional & Commercial Services
1993 Pharmaceuticals 2005 Aerospace & Defense; Professional & Commercial Services
1994 2006 Aerospace & Defense; Biotechnology & Medical Research; 
Computers, Phones & Household Electronics; Electronic 
Equipment & Parts; Media & Publishing; Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor Equipment; Textiles & Apparel
1995 Automobiles & Auto Parts; Machinery, Tools, Heavy 
Vehicles, Trains & Ships; Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
2007 Biotechnology & Medical Research; Communications & 
Networking; Electronic Equipment & Parts; Professional & 
Commercial Services
1996 2008 Biotechnology & Medical Research; Chemicals; 
Communications & Networking; Food & Tobacco; 
Household Goods; Machinery, Tools, Heavy Vehicles, 
Trains & Ships; Media & Publishing; Metals & Mining; 
Personal & Household Products & Services; Software & IT 
Services; Beverages
1997 Aerospace & Defense; Software & IT Services 2009
1998 Software & IT Services 2010
1999 Pharmaceuticals; Software & IT Services; Biotechnology & 
Medical Research
2011 Automobiles & Auto Parts; Biotechnology & Medical 
Research; Chemicals; Construction & Engineering; 
Construction Materials; Electronic Equipment & Parts; Food 
& Tobacco; Homebuilding & Construction Supplies; 
Household Goods; Machinery, Tools, Heavy Vehicles, 2000 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 2012 Professional & Commercial Services
2001 Biotechnology & Medical Research; Professional & 
Commercial Services
2013 Construction Materials; Telecommunications Services
2002 Food & Tobacco; Biotechnology & Medical Research; 
Professional & Commercial Services; Software & IT 
Services
2014 Automobiles & Auto Parts; Construction & Engineering; 
Biotechnology & Medical Research; Electronic Equipment 
& Parts; Media & Publishing
2003 Aerospace & Defense; Automobiles & Auto Parts; 
Chemicals; Food & Tobacco; Homebuilding & Construction 
Supplies; Machinery, Tools, Heavy Vehicles, Trains & 
Ships; Pharmaceuticals; Professional & Commercial 
Services; Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment; 
Software & IT Services; Telecommunications Services; 
Textiles & Apparel
2015
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Table 8. The distribution of firm-year observations 
 
Country N Leader Peer Industry
Number of 
R&D growth 
events
United Kingdom 3968 89 557 Professional & Commercial Services 8
Germany 2446 81 361 Biotechnology & Medical Research 8
France 1808 37 298 Software & IT Services 7
Switzerland 1222 34 169 Pharmaceuticals 5
Sweden 1155 37 158 Automobiles & Auto Parts 4
Finland 879 15 134 Aerospace & Defense 4
Netherlands 503 15 62 Machinery, Tools, Heavy Vehicles, Trains & Ships 4
Greece 502 8 70 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 4
Ireland; Republic of 487 10 67 Food & Tobacco 4
Italy 464 5 70 Electronic Equipment & Parts 4
Denmark 444 13 41 Chemicals 3
Belgium 400 9 64 Media & Publishing 3
Norway 344 10 47 Construction & Engineering 3
Russia 318 0 36 Homebuilding & Construction Supplies 3
Austria 298 6 47 Textiles & Apparel 3
Spain 184 1 24 Communications & Networking 2
Poland 123 1 14 Telecommunications Services 2
Luxembourg 72 1 8 Personal & Household Products & Services 2
Romania 47 0 9 Household Goods 2
Hungary 37 1 5 Construction Materials 2
Iceland 23 0 2 Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 1
Latvia 23 0 4 Metals & Mining 1
Cyprus 22 1 2 Beverages 1
Czech Republic 20 0 1 Computers, Phones & Household Electronics 1
Slovenia 19 0 1 Oil & Gas Related Equipment and Services 1
Portugal 19 0 0 Hotels & Entertainment Services 1
Isle of Man 18 1 0 Industrial Conglomerates 0
Ukraine 18 0 0 Renewable Energy 0
Republic of Serbia 18 0 2 Oil & Gas 0
Jersey 17 0 2 Healthcare Providers & Services 0
Guernsey 17 0 0 Containers & Packaging 0
Gibraltar 14 0 0 Paper & Forest Products 0
Bulgaria 12 0 0 Leisure Products 0
Malta 9 0 0 Specialty Retailers 0
Monaco 8 0 0 Office Equipment 0
Slovak Republic 7 0 2 Transport Infrastructure 0
Macedonia 5 0 0 Food & Drug Retailing 0
Estonia 4 0 2 Passenger Transportation Services 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina4 0 0 Freight & Logistics Services 0
Lithuania 4 0 0 Uranium 0
Croatia 4 0 0 Diversified Industrial Goods Wholesalers 0
Coal 0
Diversified Retail 0
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Figure 1. Distribution of firm-year observations by year
